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1 BACKGROUND 
 
 
This is a report on a continuing study of automated analyses of experiential textual reports to gain 
insight into the causal factors of human errors in aviation operations. The intent of this research is to 
better understand the quantitative and qualitative attributes of an aviation incident, and to identify 
the respective contributions of their interaction to incident occurrence. 
 
NASA’s Aviation Safety Program (AvSP), initiated in 2000 and ended in 2005, developed 
technologies that could, if implemented, reduce the aircraft accident rate by a factor of five within 
ten years and by a factor of ten within twenty years. One of the AvSP projects, the Aviation System 
Monitoring and Modeling (ASMM) project, addressed the need to provide decision makers with the 
tools for identifying and correcting the predisposing conditions that could lead to accidents. Much 
depends on being able to determine how complex systems have failed and how human behavior 
influenced such outcome failures. 
 
In the approach to the study reported here, the focus is on uncovering and understanding those 
precursor conditions that elevate the probability of downstream human errors and that, in turn, may 
contribute to aviation safety incidents or accidents. A goal is to assist the aviation safety analyst to 
understand how these systemic features shape human behavior so as to know how to improve the 
performance of the system. Information extracted from quantitative data sources helps the domain 
expert understand the objective aspects of what happened, and from data sources such as incident 
reports to understand the subjective aspects of why the incident occurred. 
 
The experiential account of the incident reporter is the best available source of information about 
why an incident happened. Volume I (Maille et al. 2006) of this report describes the exploration of a 
first-generation process for searching large databases of aviation accident or incident textual reports, 
and analyzing them for what happened as well as for why (the causal factors of human behavior). 
The studies reported here in Volume II were based on the theoretical foundation and experiments 
described in Volume I. While the reader is encouraged to review that publication, the discussions 
and results of Volume I are sufficiently summarized to allow this report to stand on its own. 
 
Mining the databases of experiential accounts of incidents poses several challenges. The current 
process that relies heavily on humans reading the reports is labor-intensive and requires high-priced 
domain expertise. Further, analyses of incident reports require not only experts with knowledge of 
aviation operations to understand what happened, but often also experts in human factors to explain 
why the reported event happened. The process of extracting information from large databases of 
incident reports requires new automated analytical capabilities to help the experts mine these rich 
and complex sources for insight into the causal, contributing, and aggravating factors of an event. 
 
A pragmatic approach to these challenges needs to start with a model that captures the underlying 
structure of an incident report with which to guide the automated analyses. Volume I described such 
a conceptual model and an approach to using it in automated analyses of textual data sources. 
 
Reporters of incidents usually describe situations they have encountered during flight operations 
having safety implications as stories about what happened, the involvement and behavior of people 
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involved, and important features that can help the analyst understand why these events occurred. All 
the information in the report can be associated with a description of a state of the reporter’s world, or 
with the characterization of an event that contributes to a transition from one state to the next. 
Operational personnel consider that an incident occurs if, for a period of time, the state of their 
world is considered as unsafe, compromised, or anomalous. The development of the ‘Incident 
Model,’ based on a sequence of states and transitions during the evolution of an incident, as a 
generic model of any anecdotal report of an incident in aviation operations is described in Volume I. 
A set of parameters that describe each state and a set of parameters that describe each transition are 
the descriptors of each step in the chronology of an incident. In Volume I, a simplified subset of the 
Incident Model called the ‘Scenario’ (fig. 1) was introduced and defined as: 
 
 SCENARIO = {CONTEXT + BEHAVIOR ! OUTCOME} 
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Figure 1. The relation of scenario to the incident model. 
 
The Scenario is a simplified description of an incident in which: 
• The ‘Context’ fits the exact description of the situation in the last safe state.1 
• The ‘Behavior’ contains all the problematic events that occur during the transition from the 
last safe state to the anomalous state. 
• The ‘Outcome’ describes why the resultant state is considered as anomalous. When the 
Outcome is an anomalous or unsafe state, the confluence of the factors of the last safe state 
and the factors influencing the Behavior of the transition is identified as a precursor. 
 
This representation is a significant simplification of reality, but it offers a pragmatic approach for 
guiding the clustering of similar incidents in this first-generation automated system. 
 
The Scenario is defined by the subsets of parameters that describe the Context, the Behavior, and the 
Outcome of the incident model that are specific to the “story” of a particular incident report. A 
typical aviation safety incident report includes a set of attributes (often in fixed fields of the 
                                                 
1
 The term “state” as used in this report means the state of the entire system relevant to the reporter’s world. 
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reporting form) and the values of those attributes (entered by the reporter) plus the reporter’s 
narrative of the incident. The fixed fields of the forms contain a good deal of structured objective 
information relating to the Context and Outcome of a reported safety event (i.e., what happened), but 
very little structured information relating to the Behaviors of the people and automation that 
contributed to the events (i.e., why it happened). 
 
An experiment described in Volume I confirmed that automated tools could reliably cluster incident 
reports and provide an adequate description of the Context and the Outcome of a Scenario on the 
basis of the structured objective information. A further experiment described in Volume I 
demonstrated that there are statistically significant relationships in typical incident reports between 
the objective parameters describing Contextual Factors and the objective parameters describing 
anomalous Outcomes. More importantly, a review of the results by domain experts confirmed that 
these were also operationally significant relationships. 
 
All of this was preparatory to pursuing the objective of automatically defining the why. The 
experiments described in Volume I demonstrated that automated techniques could adequately 
describe what happened, and that the what could be used as a basis of similarity for clustering 
incident reports. There remained the challenge to identify the causal factors of the Behavior that 
produced the transition from the last safe state to the unwanted Outcome—the why—in the Scenario 
model of figure 1 for each such cluster. This causal information must be extracted from the 
experiential narrative of the reporter of the incident. Consequently, in the development of the second 
stage of filtering to be described in this report, the understanding of why the incident happened relies 
on exploitation of the free text and the extraction of subjective parameters.2
 
The questions that this challenge posed were 
Is there a conceptual paradigm that will provide a reliable explanation of the discriminating 
factors that constitute the Behavior entailed in incidents from large aviation databases?  
Can this description be used to “tune” automated analyses that will extract useful information 
about Behavior in a set of similar incidents? 
 
 
2 INITIAL METHODS AND APPROACHES 
 
 
It was desirable to minimize the domain for analyzing why a Scenario happened so as to maximize 
the possibility of success with this first-generation process. This was achieved in two ways: first, 
domain knowledge was used to generate rules to maximize the information extracted automatically 
from the objective parameters about what happened, and second, a simplified model of Behavior 
was used as a basis for guiding the automated analysis to understand why. 
                                                 
2
 The experiential narratives of incident reports such as those in the ASRS are rich sources of information regarding the 
behaviors of pilots, air traffic controllers, other persons, and automated agents during the course of the reported events.  
However, the unstructured nature of these data creates an analytical challenge. 
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The simplified model of Behavior used to “guide” the automated system in a plausible direction 
relied on knowledge of human behavior. A perspective emerging from scientific literature is that the 
occasional errors made by pilots and other skilled experts occur in a somewhat random fashion, so 
that human-factors scientists speak of factors influencing the probability of errors rather than 
causing errors. Also, an accident or an incident is, most often, the consequence of a complex 
interplay of multiple factors, combining in ways driven in large degree by chance. Multiple factors, 
not all of which can be determined and measured, interact to produce a human error in a given 
instance. There is an implicit concept here of the strength or dominance of causal factors, so that it 
becomes important to identify the strongest causal factors while admitting that weaker factors and 
interactions may well play a role. It is in this sense that the term causal factors is used throughout 
this report. 
 
2.1 Situation Awareness 
 
At this exploratory stage of the research, the omission of many plausible (albeit rare) factors that are 
known to influence human behavior (such as physiological and psychomotor factors) was acceptable 
if an ability to aid in the identification of a few important common ones could be demonstrated. 
Furthermore, from the perspective of this study, references to the causal factors of human error mean 
the systemic features (both latent and proximate) that cause one or more of the human operators of 
the system to be unable to predict correctly the consequences of his/her/their action(s). This is 
associated with an inadequate awareness of the state of his/her/their world. So, in this initial attempt 
to cope with this complex problem, it was proposed that the behavioral failure responsible for 
transitioning from the Context of the last safe state to a compromised or anomalous state of the 
Outcome in aviation Scenarios is always associated with a loss of “Situation Awareness (SA).” This 
approach is based on the substantial body of literature reporting on a variety of perspectives of SA 
and its role in human behavior. (See, for example, Endsley 1988, Gronlund et al. 1998, Durso and 
Gronlund 1999, Shively et al. 1997, and Sohn and Doane 2000, Hartel et al. 1991, Endsley 1995a, 
Jones & Endsley 1996, and Gibson et al. 1997.) 
 
Further, it was proposed that the discriminating and constructive factors of loss of SA are failures to  
Detect. Detection is the act of discovering, discerning, or capturing attention as this is related 
to the existence, presence, or fact of an event. 
Recognize. Recognition is the act of relating a detected event to a class or type of event that 
has been perceived before.  
Interpret. Interpretation is the act of relating a specific event type to a network of actual and 
possible events of various other types. 
Comprehend. Comprehension is the act of perceiving the significance of an event. 
Predict. Prediction is the act of forecasting what will happen in the near future.  
 
(See, for example, Endsley 2000a, Endsley 2000b, and Shively, R. J., et al. 1997) Detection, 
Recognition, Interpretation, Comprehension, and Prediction (DRICP) were seen as useful concepts 
for “tuning” the automated analyses of this second stage of filtering. 
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Endsley had earlier proposed a three-level taxonomic structure for classifying and describing errors 
in SA that correspond to the five components of SA proposed above for use in this study (Endsley 
1994, 1995a, & 1995b). Detection and Recognition are necessary for Endsley’s Level 1 SA (Endsley 
1996, 2000a, & 2000b). Interpretation and Comprehension are necessary for Level 2 SA (Endsley 
1996, 2000a, & 2000b). Prediction is the primary roll in her highest level (Level 3) of SA. The 
relationship between these two frameworks of Jones and Endsley and DRICP is presented in table A. 
 
It was suggested that, if it was found to be impossible to discriminate to the five levels of detail of 
DRICP, the analyses would be adapted to Endsley’s three-level taxonomy of perception, 
comprehension, and projection. In any case, Endsley’s lower-level descriptions of each of her three 
levels would help to develop representative concepts, words, or phrases that a reporter of an incident 
might use to indicate the components of loss of SA. The framework shown in table A helped 
structure the creation of the concepts of behavior that the automated data mining would pursue. 
 
TABLE A. RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN DRICP AND JONES & ENDSLEY’S 
LEVELS OF LOSS OF SA 
  Scenario Model Behavior Descriptors 
   Detection Recognition Interpretation Comprehension Prediction
Level 1: Fail to perceive 
information or misperception 
of information 
++ ++    
Data not available ++ ++    
Hard to discriminate or detect 
data 
++ ++    
Failure to monitor or observe 
data 
++ ++    
Misperception of data 
  ++ ++  
Memory loss 
  ++ ++  
Level 2: Improper integration 
or comprehension of 
information 
  ++ ++  
Lack of or incomplete mental 
model  
  ++ ++  
Use of incorrect mental model 
  ++ ++  
Over-reliance on default values 
  ++ ++  
Other 
  ? ?  
Level 3: Incorrect projection 
of future actions of the system 
    ++ 
Lack of or incomplete mental 
model 
    ++ 
Over-projection of current 
trends 
    ++ 
Jo
ne
s a
nd
 E
n
ds
le
y 
Other 
    ++ 
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However, before the development of this second stage of filtering was undertaken, a small 
experiment was conducted to see whether aviation-safety subject-matter experts would agree with 
the losses of SA that were identified automatically. 
 
2.2 The Workshop 
 
The procedure for the analysis, described in Volume I, was based on the expectation of being able to 
identify words and phrases with which to discriminate and reliably find the specific aspect(s) of loss 
of SA (at least to the granularity of Jones and Endsley’s three levels) that correlated statistically with 
the Context and the anomalous Outcome of each safety-related Scenario. The proposal was to seek 
relationships between those aspects of loss of SA for a specific Outcome with factors of the Context 
that had already been found to exist in each Scenario to identify the factors associated with why the 
event occurred. 
 
Before proceeding with these analyses, a workshop was convened of representatives from human 
factors, aviation operations, ASRS, computational linguistics, human performance modeling, and 
data mining to develop representative concepts, words, or phrases that a reporter of an incident 
might use to indicate the components of SA. (The workshop participants are identified in 
Appendix A.) In multiple sessions, small groups read the same subset of ASRS reports to relate 
them to each of Jones and Endsley’s three levels of SA shown in table A. The participants were 
divided among the sessions, with intent to assess the strength of agreement on the identification of 
the level(s) of the loss of SA portrayed in each report and to capture illustrative phrases for each 
level that could be used to guide automated mining of the unstructured text. 
 
The objective was not realized. However, the process was enlightening. The groups had difficulty 
making sharp distinctions among the concepts of loss of SA even at the granularity of Jones and 
Endsley’s three levels of SA. Therefore, they were unable to come to agreement on illustrative 
phrases in the ASRS reports that were indicative of each level. However, retrospective analysis of 
the discussions during these sessions revealed a fundamental aspect of the nature of these reports. 
 
During these discussions, the workshop team always seemed to go back to contextual factors as they 
searched for clues to Jones and Endsley’s categories of loss of SA in the sample set of ASRS 
reports. Invariably, the workshop team found that the reporters spoke of the environment 
surrounding the incident. In fact, it seemed that reporters found it hard to refer to categories of loss 
of SA without linking these to various contextual factors, and further analysis from a human-factors 
perspective pointed to good psychological reasons for this. Since an individual (in this case, the 
reporter) is a constant from his or her own point of view, it is difficult for that individual to attribute 
the cause of an unusual event (incident) to his or her own behavior. The individual has had the 
experience of many, many other situations where he or she was also present, and which were 
normal, not anomalous. It is natural to attribute an unusual event to something unusual in the 
environment, hence to a contextual factor rather than a (personal) human factor such as loss of SA. 
This could explain the rather high incidence of statements about distractions, interruptions, and high 
workload, and the very low incidence of reference to any psychological factors associated with loss 
of SA in the sample subset of ASRS reports used for the workshop. 
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A subsequent review of a larger number of ASRS reports with this new perspective reinforced this 
interpretation of the results of the workshop. It was found that, frequently, reporters provide 
“advice” in their reports to the ASRS, which implies the reporter’s perception of causal factors and 
potential interventions. The advice is often associated with the words ‘should’ or ‘ought,’ as in the 
following few exemplary excerpts taken from ASRS reports: 
 
I FEEL THAT THESE DEER SHOULD BE EITHER RELOCATED OR INSTALL A FENCE 
AROUND THE ARPT. 
THIS APCH SHOULD BE OTS IF SUCH A RESTR IS REQUIRED, AND WINDS ALOFT 
ARE FROM THE N. 
I FEEL THAT THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN A HOLD SHORT LINE BEFORE RWY 1. 
A SE TXWY SHOULD BE INSTALLED. 
THE INCORRECT PAPERWORK SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISCOVERED WELL BEFORE 
DEPARTING, BUT PRESSURE TO KEEP THINGS MOVING PUT US IN A 'GO' MODE. 
I THINK THE SIGN SHOULD BE TO THE L (S) OF TXWY G AND PARALLEL TO RWY 
35L/17R. 
I FREQUENTLY HAVE TO ASK FOR WIND INFO FOR TKOFS AND LNDGS WHICH 
SHOULD ALWAYS BE GIVEN. 
BECAUSE OF TIME PRESSURE TO GET FLT OUT, THE REQUIREMENT TO CHK OIL 
QUANTITY WAS OVERLOOKED AND NO ONE FROM MAINT SHOWED UP TO CHK. 
AN ENTRY SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE AND SIGNED OFF IN LOGBOOK BUT WAS 
NOT. 
PERHAPS A TAXI INSTRUCTION OF A DIFFERENT TYPE, IN REGARDS TO THE TXWY 
MERGER, OUGHT TO BE GIVEN SOME CONSIDERATION. 
IT OUGHT TO HAVE A WARNING HORN AT 300 FT FROM ALT. 
TWR OUGHT NOT TO SEQUENCE RELATIVELY FAST ACFT SUCH AS MY M20R 
BEHIND TRAINERS. 
WE OUGHT TO GO TO SCHOOL ON THIS TO PREVENT PROBS THAT COULD 
RESULT AT NIGHT OR IN THE WX. 
 
Notice that in these examples and many others (though not all others), the causal factors and 
recommended interventions are linked to contextual factors rather than behavioral factors. 
(Behavioral examples can be found in association with “I should,” “I should have,” “we should,” or 
“we should have”: “WE SHOULD HAVE TAKEN HIM OUT OF PLT'S SEAT EARLIER.”) 
 
It was decided that this argument was valid, and the fact that contextual factors are going to be 
closely connected in the experiential report with behavior (i.e., loss of SA) should be accepted. 
Moreover, this is consistent with the original objective (as stated in Volume I (Maille et al. 2006)) 
and, in particular, at Step 3 of figure 9 of that report); namely, to identify the objective contextual 
factors related to failure modes of SA. The realizations gained from the workshop caused a change 
in approach to focus on fully capturing the context as it is reported as influencing the reporter’s 
behavior rather than on the cognitive failure modes of SA.  
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3 A MODEL FOR BEHAVIOR 
 
 
3.1 Contextual Shaping Factors 
 
In Volume I, what was called the “full and complete” set of parameters to describe any pilot’s 
aviation safety incident report was identified. Of these, those parameters that were objective, 
categorical, and measurable, and were claimed to be adequate to describe what happened were 
identified. These objective parameters that could adequately describe the Context and the Outcome 
of a Scenario are, for the most part, contained within the fixed fields of a typical incident report. An 
understanding of why the incident occurred entailed the remaining parameters (that were arbitrarily 
labeled “subjective”), which would have to be extracted from the free narrative part of the report. It 
was postulated in Volume I that these parameters could be related to the failure modes of SA and 
that they would correlate with the existing contextual factors to explain the why of the failures. 
However, the experience of the workshop was convincing evidence that the reporters were already 
describing these contextual factors and a search for the cognitive failure modes per se could be 
bypassed. These contextual factors are the ones that the experiential report says influenced the 
reporter’s behavior and, to avoid confusion with the objective parameters of the Context (from the 
fixed fields), these factors derived from the narrative are referred to as “Shaping Factors.” This term 
has been used in a number of reports, such as Sasou, K., & Reason, J. 1999.3
 
To test the merits of this approach, the “full and complete” set of parameters was reviewed to 
identify a set of Shaping Factors that could be used to guide the automated analysis in the next 
experiment. In Volume I, a codification form was described that had been designed to update the 
codification of ASRS reports called the X-Form. After several years of experience entering reports 
into the ASRS database and conducting retrospective searches, the X-Form was developed by 
experienced ASRS analysts in collaboration with human-factors research and aviation operational 
personnel to improve the descriptions of factors that influence human performance in aviation 
operations. The X-Form was selected for a subset of parameters to use as the “Shaping Factors” in 
an initial experiment to evaluate a capability to identify these automatically from the free narrative 
of a set of incident reports. Table B is the set of fourteen Shaping Factors with brief definitions and 
exemplary expressions taken from incident reports that were used to evaluate an ability to identify 
factors such as these automatically from the free narratives of incident reports (Posse et al. 2004). 
 
                                                 
3
 In the literature (e.g., Swain 1983), the “Context” has been called the external Performance Shaping Factors (PSF), and 
what has been labeled in this report as the “Shaping Factors” have been called the internal PSF.  
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TABLE B. SHAPING FACTORS 
Factor Definition Example 
Attitude Any indication of unprofessional or antagonistic attitude 
by a controller or flight crew member, e.g., 
complacency or ‘get-homeitis’ (in a hurry to get home).
“I believe a contributing factor was 
complacency flying a very familiar 
approach, also it was our last leg 
get-thereitis.” 
Communica-
tion 
Environment 
Interferences with communications in the cockpit such 
as noise, auditory interference, radio frequency 
congestion, or language barrier. 
“We were unable to hear because 
traffic alert and collision avoid-
ance systems were very loud.” 
Duty Cycle A strong indication of an unusual working period e.g., a 
long day, flying very late at night, exceeding duty time 
regulations, having short and inadequate rest periods. 
“Flight had previously been 
delayed and we had minimum rest 
period coming up, less than 9 
hours.” 
Familiarity Any indication of a lack of factual knowledge, such as 
new to or unfamiliar with company, airport, or aircraft. 
“Both pilots were unfamiliar with 
the area.” 
Illusion Illusions include bright lights that cause something to 
blend in, black hole, white out, or sloping terrain. 
“I was flying and was experiencing 
a black hole effect.” 
Physical 
Environment 
Unusual physical conditions that could impair flying or 
make things difficult, such as unusually hot or cold 
temperatures inside the cockpit, cluttered workspace, 
visual interference, bad weather, or turbulence. 
“This occurred because of the 
intense glare of the sun.” 
Physical 
Factors 
Pilot ailment that could impair flying or make things 
more difficult, such as being tired, fatigued, drugged, 
incapacitated, influenced by alcohol, suffering from 
vertigo, illness, dizziness, hypoxia, nausea, loss of sight, 
or loss of hearing. 
“I allowed fatigue and stress to 
cloud my judgment.” 
Preoccupation A preoccupation, distraction, or division of attention 
that creates a deficit in performance, such as being 
preoccupied, busy (doing something else), or distracted.
“My attention was divided 
inappropriately.” 
Pressure Psychological pressure, such as feeling intimidated, 
pressured, pressed for time, or being low on fuel. 
“I felt rushed to complete the 
checklist in time.” 
Proficiency A general deficit in capabilities, such as inexperience, 
lack of training, not qualified, not current, or lack of 
proficiency. 
“The biggest safety factor here is 
the lack of adequate training in the 
newer autopilot system.” 
Resource 
Deficiency 
Absence, insufficient number, or poor quality of a 
resource, such as overworked or unavailable controller, 
insufficient or out-of-date chart, equipment malfunction, 
inoperative, deferred, or missing equipment. 
“Later I learned the minimum 
equipment list was wrong.” 
Taskload Indicators of a heavy workload or many tasks at once, 
such as short-handed crew. 
“Due to high workload, I forgot to 
switch to tower.” 
Unexpected Something sudden and surprising that is not expected. “Had we known of him prior to 
takeoff we would have made 
adjustments.” 
Other Anything else that could be a shaper, such as shift 
change, passenger discomfort, or disorientation.  
“This happened during shift 
change.” “Ill passenger on 
board.” 
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These Shaping Factors are not mutually exclusive and some may be more difficult to discriminate 
than others. It is not suggested that these are the “full and complete” set of contextual factors that 
can influence human performance. At this stage, they were simply selected to test the concept for 
automated data mining on a subset of typical incident reports. 
 
A series of brainstorming sessions involving aviation safety experts, human factors experts, English 
specialists, and data analysts from non-aviation backgrounds generated a large number of seed 
keywords (i.e., words that consistently and reliably indicate the presence of a particular shaping 
function), simple expressions (i.e., strings that systematically indicate the presence of particular 
shaping functions), and template expressions (i.e., complex expressions associated with a particular 
shaping function that may occur in many different variants in the narrative) for each shaping 
function. (Examples of each for the shaping factor of “Pilot Fatigue” are presented later in this 
report.) 
 
The next step was to test the ability to use these definitions and exemplary phrases to discriminate 
the Shaping Factors from the free narratives of incident reports pertaining to each Scenario. 
However, it is not sufficient to find such expressions in the narratives, because the context in which 
they are used must be taken into account. Most importantly, this means checking for the presence of 
negative modifiers in close proximity to a given expression that changes the meaning of the 
expression. For example, the expressions like “I have not had an exhausting day,” “If I had felt I was 
tired I would...,” “…fatigue was not an issue,” indicate that fatigue was, in fact, not a significant 
factor. 
 
Consequently, it was recognized that the traditional keyword-based and bag-of-words approaches 
that worked so well on the fixed fields for analyzing the Context and the Outcome of each Scenario 
would be of limited value for analyzing the Shaping Factors of Behavior. More complex pattern 
extraction methods were required, and an understanding of the nature of the narratives to be 
analyzed was needed in order to identify the most appropriate available methods for this task. 
 
3.2 The Narratives of Incident Reports 
 
The narratives of incident reports are, generally, highly informal and replete with the acronyms, 
idioms, multiple spellings, misspellings, and ambiguous abbreviations that are specific to each 
domain and even to tasks. The informal reporting setting tends to produce poor grammar, spelling 
variants, very domain- or task-specific expressions, as well as jargon. (This statement is strongly 
supported in the study reported by Van Delden and Gomez (Feb., 2004).) Stream of consciousness 
permeates the reports, which may exhibit feelings of anger, guilt, or defense. Styles and even 
languages vary dramatically, from telegraphic to very detailed, and depend on whether the narrator 
is a pilot, an air-traffic controller, a flight attendant, a mechanic, or ground personnel. The following 
ASRS report is representative of incident reports and illustrates some of these characteristics: 
 
“I RETURNED FROM A LCL TRNING FLT. PER TWR, WE LANDED ON RWY 4R AT 
MDW. SHORTLY AFTER OUR T/D, THE ACFT EXPERIENCED SEVERE NOSE 
SHIMMY VIBRATION. WE SLOWED DOWN AND TURNED LEFT AS PER TWR 
INSTRUCTIONS OFF OF RWY 4R. WE SWITCHED TO GND AND THEY TOLD US 
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TO TAXI TO THE N RAMP. WE PROCEEDED TO DO SO. FIVE SECS LATER, GND 
ASKED US HOW DO WE HEAR. WE TOLD THEM LOUD AND CLEAR. AFTER 15 
SECS GND TOLD US TO CALL THE TWR. WE DID AND TWR TOLD US WE XED 
AN ACTIVE RWY (4L) W/O THEIR PERMISSION. TWR SAID AS WE WERE LNDG 
HE TOLD US TO TURN LEFT AND HOLD SHORT OF RWY 4L AND REMAIN WITH 
HIM. WE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT HEAR HIM DUE TO THE EXTREME NOISE 
CAUSED BY THE NOSE SHIMMY. GND SHOULD NOT HAVE TOLD US TO TAXI 
TO THE N RAMP. TWR TOLD US ON THE PHONE THAT THERE WAS LNDG TFC 
ROLLING ON RWY 4L AT THE TIME WE XED RWY 4L....” 
 
Consequently, the first step toward automated analyses of such narratives entailed language 
normalization and knowledge infusion from aviation-domain experts. Normalization produces 
readable and correct English text, while knowledge infusion elicits the peculiar expressions used by 
personnel involved in aviation operations. A way was needed to standardize the language of the 
culture of flight operations before automated analysis of this sort of text could be considered. 
 
3.3 Textual Preparation 
 
3.3.1 PLADS 
PLADS is a tool developed by Battelle’s Pacific Northwest Division for this project to standardize 
the language of unstructured text so as to facilitate its reliable automated analysis. PLADS uses a 
combination of standard English and domain-specific concepts to improve text-mining effectiveness. 
PLADS is used as a pre-processor in conjunction with other text analysis tools, whether they entail 
statistical (i.e., “bag-of-words”) or Natural Language Processing (NLP) tools, to facilitate analysis of 
free text. PLADS is composed of software (Java, Matlab, and Perl) and lexicons. The development 
of the lexicons when PLADS is adapted to a new domain for the first time requires an expert in 
PLADS working with an expert in the reporting language of that domain.  
 
PLADS is an acronym of the names of the following five stages of filtering performed on each 
report prior to its automated analysis: 
• Phrases identified and concatenated. Identify phrases in the unstructured text by statistical 
means by identifying 2-, 3-, 4-, 5-word strings that occur more often than one would expect 
based solely on the individual word frequency. Then concatenate the phrase into what would 
be identified as a single word to subsequent software: e.g., ClassCAirspace, 
UnitedStatesOfAmerica. 
• Leave some words unprocessed. 
• Augment some words to make the meaning more useful for computer analysis. Some words 
may be abbreviations for instruments and/or concepts with make/model/series, or numeric 
values of selected concepts for example:  
− “B-757-300” might be augmented with the word “airplane.” 
− “FL28” (“FL26,” “FL30”) means “flight level at approximately 28,000 (26,000, 30,000) 
feet.” Augmenting with “FlightLevel” enables subsequent software to identify these 3 
(and others) as related to a flight-level concept, leaving the refinements of which specific 
flight level to finer grain analysis. 
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− “24L,” “24R,” “25L,” “25R” all relate to runways. Augmenting with the word “runway” 
enables the software to capture that concept. 
− Proper names are often augmented with the more general concept, e.g., “Dallas” 
augmented with “city.” 
− Airport abbreviations are often augmented with the word “airport,” e.g., “LAX,” “ORD,” 
“DFW.” 
•  Delete some words to simplify the analysis. These are often called “stop” words. Examples 
include: “the,” “a,” “an.” Sometimes numbers are dropped out. 
•  Substitute some words for others. Often there are many ways to express the same concept. 
This includes synonyms, abbreviations, jargon, and slang. For example “pilot” might be 
substituted for these words: “pilots,” “co-pilot,” “captain,” “co-captain,” “left seater,” “PIC,” 
“Pilot-in-Charge,” “plt,” and “plts.” Standard abbreviations can be checked and full 
meanings substituted. Spelled-out numbers may be replaced by the numeral. 
 
Following is the example of the ASRS report shown in the previous section after it has been 
processed through PLADS (which does not do a perfect job as, for example, “TURNING FLIGHT” 
should be “TRAINING FLIGHT”): 
 
I RETURNED FROM A LOCAL TURNING FLIGHT. PER TOWER, WE LANDED ON 
RUNWAY 4R AT MDW. SHORTLY AFTER OUR TOUCHDOWN, THE AIRCRAFT 
EXPERIENCED SEVERE NOSE SHIMMY VIBRATION. WE SLOWED DOWN AND 
TURNED LEFT AS PER TOWER INSTRUCTIONS OFF OF RUNWAY 4R. WE 
SWITCHED TO GROUND AND THEY TOLD US TO TAXI TO THE NORTH RAMP. 
WE PROCEEDED TO DO SO. FIVE SECONDS LATER, GROUND ASKED US HOW 
DO WE HEAR. WE TOLD THEM LOUD AND CLEAR. AFTER 15 SECONDS 
GROUND TOLD US TO CALL THE TOWER. WE DID AND TOWER TOLD US WE 
CROSSED AN ACTIVE RUNWAY WITHOUT THEIR PERMISSION. TOWER SAID 
AS WE WERE LANDING HE TOLD US TO TURN LEFT AND HOLD SHORT OF 
RUNWAY 4L AND REMAIN WITH HIM. WE OBVIOUSLY DID NOT HEAR HIM 
DUE TO THE EXTREME NOISE CAUSED BY THE NOSE SHIMMY. GROUND 
SHOULD NOT HAVE TOLD US TO TAXI TO THE NORTH RAMP. TOWER TOLD US 
ON THE PHONE THAT THERE WAS LANDING TRAFFIC ROLLING ON RUNWAY 
4L AT THE TIME WE CROSSED RUNWAY 4L… . 
 
3.4 Analysis of Free Narratives 
 
The use of PLADS (even with its imperfections) greatly improves the potential value of any 
subsequent automated text analysis because it reduces the domain to be analyzed. The previous work 
to capture the Context and Outcome of incident reports was based on the fixed-field data for which 
statistical (i.e., “bag of words”) tools worked very well. However, something more in Natural 
Language Processing would be needed to capture the information about “Shaping Factors” that the 
reporter conveys in the free text. 
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Figure 2 diagrams the state of the art of Natural Language Processing showing the stages of 
expression detection with examples of the expressions that would be identified with a particular 
concept (in this example, the concept of “familiarity”).4 Capabilities for extracting meaning are 
extremely limited, and even syntactic parsing or event extraction push the state of the art of Natural 
Language Processing (NLP). Analysis of aviation-incident Scenarios requires some of both. 
 
Similar Expressions
String Matching
Event Co-reference 
Scenario Template
Syntactic Parsing
Part-of-Speech
Entity Extraction
Event Extraction
research 
Example: “Familiarity” 
“Unfamiliar”, “Unacquainted” 
 
“This setting was * new to me”  
(* = “somewhat”, “quite”, “entirely” 
   but  • “not”, or “not quite”) 
 
 
“The regulations had * changed  * since … .”
 
 
“I had not performed this procedure for 
years… .” 
 
 
 
“I [did something] … we went too high 
because on this plane the [tool] is more 
sensitive than on the 737 (suggesting that the 
pilot is familiar with the B737, but not the 
plane he/she is flying right now).” 
mature 
N
LP
 D
ep
th
 
 
Figure 2. Spectrum of concept expressions. 
 
After an investigation into available tools, the General Architecture for Text Engineering (GATE) 
tool was selected to capture NLP of the incident-report narratives after they had been processed 
through PLADS. 
 
3.4.1 GATE 
GATE (General Architecture for Text Engineering), a software tool created by the University of 
Sheffield (see http://nlp.shef.ac.uk/.), is one of the most widely used human language processing 
systems in the world. GATE has had great success at TREC (Text REtrieval Conference) series  
co-sponsored by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Information Technology 
Laboratory's Retrieval Group of the Information Access Division, and the Advanced R&D Activity 
of the DOD in head-to-head competition with numerous other techniques. 
 
GATE comprises an architecture, framework, and graphical development environment to identify 
evidence of specific concepts contained in unstructured text. The concepts may be vaguely defined, 
and phrased in a way as to require subtle insight to identify their existence. (See Manning and 
Schültze 2000 and Cunningham et al. 2002). GATE provides framework for applying customizable 
tools for data mining. A GATE gazetteer is a list of expressions compiled into finite state machines 
                                                 
4
 Figure 2 was internally generated, but it is consistent with the state of the art presented in all of the current literature on 
analysis of free text. 
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that can match text tokens. Gazetteers tend to produce more false positives, but less false negatives 
because exact matches are determined out of context. Therefore, gazetteers are a good place to start 
encoding simple shaper expressions to control the false negative rate. GATE includes a pattern 
specification language called Java Annotation Patterns Engine (JAPE), which describes patterns to 
match and annotations to be created as a result. This means that the aviation-incident reports can be 
tagged with respect to the shaping factors, where the tags correspond to the annotations generated by 
JAPE. JAPE rules can be refined very rapidly without having to rewrite large pieces of code and can 
easily handle matching exceptions. The tools available within GATE enable specific concepts to be 
identified using synonyms and Boolean expressions to identify natural language phrases that were 
not envisioned. JAPE enables the provision of rules to cope with all such possible variations. 
 
While there are numerous other methods of doing NLP, a study of these found NLP via GATE to be 
more effective at identifying specific concepts in the free text of aviation-incident reports. 
 
3.5 The Experiment 
 
The corpus of data selected for the experiment was a subset of ASRS reports about one or more of a 
selected set of anomalous Outcomes. The total set of about a hundred anomalies as identified by the 
ASRS Office was described in Volume I of this report (Maille et al. 2006) and is shown in Appendix 
B.5 From among these the following ten ASRS anomalies were selected for this experiment: 
• Aircraft Equipment Problem 
• Altitude Deviation 
• Conflict (Airborne) 
• Conflict (Ground) 
• Ground Incursion 
• Ground Incursion (Clearance) 
• In-flight Weather Encounter 
• Maintenance Problem 
• Non-adherence 
• Airspace Violation 
 
This is the same set of Outcomes that was used in the experiment described in Volume I to identify 
correlations between Outcomes and Contexts. 
 
For the present experiment, a subset of 17,155 ASRS reports was identified that pertained to one or 
more of these ten anomalous Outcomes to explore why these Scenarios occurred. GATE was used in 
analyses of the free texts of these 17,155 incident reports to try to identify the Shaping Factors (of 
the fourteen presented in table B) that prevailed (or did not prevail) in each of the ten anomalous 
Outcomes.  
 
The processing of ASRS narratives was conducted in several phases: pre-processing for language 
normalization, tokenization and generation of token sequences, exact expressions recognition, and 
template expressions extraction. Accordingly, a modular architecture was developed comprised of 
the components and functions depicted in figure 3 (Posse et al. 2004). 
 
                                                 
5
 ASRS Anomaly codes provide classification of abnormal or irregular events, or events at variance with ATC 
clearances or instructions.   
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ASRS Narratives
Preprocessor
Normalized Text
Token Sequences
Tokenizer
Recognizer
Annotated Text
Annotated Text
Template Extractor
Domain-specific Lexicons
– Abbreviations
– Acronyms
– Spelling variants
– Synonyms
Token Templates
Shaper Lexicons
Shaper Template
  Expressions in
  Common Pattern
  Specification Language
 
Figure 3. Processing steps for the extraction of shaper references. 
 
Except for the preprocessor phase, all steps in the architecture of figure 3 were implemented within 
GATE. The preprocessing of each of the 17,155 reports for vocabulary standardization was 
conducted with PLADS. The lexicons used in this phase were developed by an expert in PLADS 
working with several experts in the reporting language of aviation-incident reports. 
 
As described previously in this report, aviation-domain and human-factors experts working with 
NLP experts conceived of and defined the Shaping Factors of table B together with a seed set of 
natural language expressions for each factor, which were then enriched by using them as inputs for 
the recognizer and template-extractor phases of figure 3. 
 
The GATE gazetteer was used to mine the incident-report database for each simple expression and 
to analyze the sentences in which that expression appeared. Whenever this context did not contain 
any modifier, a simple expression was kept within the gazetteer. Exact matches are much faster than 
regular expression matches. As was noted earlier, the use of the gazetteer was deemed a good way to 
start encoding simple expressions to control the false negative rate before proceeding to the 
development of related JAPE rules for each of the Shaping Factors. Following are examples of 
synonyms for the notion of pilot fatigue found in the ASRS database using the GATE gazetteer: 
• fatigue, tiredness, no sleep, lack of sleep, inadequate sleep, little sleep, short sleep, not sleep, 
did not sleep, didn't sleep, did not sleep, couldn't sleep, not slept, didn’t rest. 
• little energy, no energy, no rest, lack of energy, lack of rest, insufficient rest, inadequate rest, 
stay awake, awake since, on duty since. 
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• tired, exhausted, dog-tired, fatigued. 
• strenuous leg, extended hours, demanding hours, prolonged hours, exhausting day, frantic 
week. 
• tough flight, heavy duty day, it was late, through the night, end of duty time. 
 
Expressions that contain more than one word are more likely to be expressed in different forms; the 
more terms in an expression, the more variants can be found in the free narratives of the incident 
reports. For example, in the case of pilot fatigue, “pilot mentions that incident occurred during a 
certain leg of a several day/leg trip” was used as a seed, and the following variations on that theme 
were found: 
 
LAST LEG OF A 2 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A TWO DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A 3 DAY TRIP 
FINAL LEG OF A 3 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A 3-DAY TRIP 
FINAL LEG OF A 3-DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A LONG 3-DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A LONG 5-LEG DAY 
LAST LEG OF 3 DAY TRIP 
FINAL LEG OF 3 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF 3-DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A FOUR DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A 4 DAY TRIP 
FINAL LEG OF A 4 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A 4-DAY TRIP 
FINAL LEG OF A 4-DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF 4 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF AN ALL DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF OUR 3 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A SIX LEG WAY 
LAST LEG OF THE DAY 
FINAL LEG OF THE DAY 
LAST LEG OF THE TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A LONG TRIP 
FINAL LEG OF THE TRIP 
LAST LEG OF A 4 LEG 
LAST LEG OF 4 LEGS 
LAST LEG OF A LONG DAY 
LAST LEG OF A VERY LONG DAY 
LAST LEG OF THE NIGHT 
LAST FLIGHT OF THE DAY 
LAST FLIGHT OF A 2 DAY TRIP 
LAST FLIGHT OF THE TRIP 
LAST FLIGHT OF THAT DAY 
LAST FLIGHT OF THAT DAY 
LAST FLIGHT OF A FOUR DAY TRIP 
LAST FLIGHT OF A 5 LEG 
LAST FLIGHT OF A LONG BYT 
UNPROFITABLE DAY 
LAST SEGMENT OF A 3-DAY 
FINAL SEGMENT OF A LEG WAY 
NEXT TO LAST LEG OF TRIP 
DAY 2 ON A 4 DAY TRIP 
THIRD DAY OF A 3 DAY TRIP 
THIRD DAY OF A 4 DAY TRIP 
LAST LEG OF DAY #3 
3RD LEG OF A 4 LEG 
3RD DAY OF A 4-DAY TRIP 
THIRD LEG OF A 4 LEG, 1 DAY TRIP 
THIRD DAY OF A 3 DAY TRIP 
THIRD DAY ON A 4 DAY TRIP 
THIRD LEG OF A 2 DAY TRIP 
4TH AND LAST LEG OF THE TRIP 
4TH LEG OF A LONG DAY 
FIFTH LEG OF THE DAY 
SIXTH LEG OF A SEVEN LEG DAY 
10TH LEG OF AN 11 LEG DAY ON DAY 3 
OF A 3 DAY TRIP 
11TH LEG OF THE DAY 
10 HRS INTO A 12 HR DUTY DAY 
NEARING THE END OF A LONG 3-DAY 
TRIP 
END OF A 2-DAY TRIP 
END OF A 3 DAY TRIP 
DAY THREE OF A THREE DAY TRIP 
DAY 3 OF A THREE DAY TRIP 
DAY 4 OF 4 DAYS 
DAY 4 OF A 4 DAY TRIP 
THIRD DAY OF A THREE DAY TRIP 
SECOND DAY OF A THREE DAY TRIP 
LAST NIGHT OF A 6 NIGHT TRIP 
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Trying to capture all of these expressions and the likely variants that can appear in future reports 
within gazetteers is too laborious. A better approach is to understand the patterns in the set of variant 
expressions and encode these patterns into templates to be matched. GATE’s JAPE was used to 
describe patterns to match and to create annotations corresponding to the tags with respect to the 
Shaping Factors assigned to each report. The next step was to write the rules in JAPE computer code 
to capture the wide set of variations on the natural expressions for each Shaping Factor found in the 
database and new likely variants to be found in future aviation-incident reports. (See Posse 2004 for 
more detail on this process.) 
 
Posse (2004) reports on a small experiment to evaluate this approach in which the GATE encoding 
of the 14 Shaping Factors was run on a random sample of 20 incident reports from commercial 
passenger flights filed by pilots. Aviation-domain experts considered the results to be plausible and 
probable. On the basis of the success of that small experiment, the full experiment on the 17,155 
incident reports of the ten selected anomalous Outcomes to identify the Shaping Factors associated 
with each was conducted. 
 
3.5.1 Analyses 
PLADS plus GATE was used to analyze the narratives of the 17,155 incident reports to identify the 
Shaping Factors. The graphic of figure 4 is an example of some of the results of these analyses. 
 
P
ro
b
a
b
ili
ty
At
tit
ud
e
C
om
m
un
ic
at
io
n 
En
vi
ro
nm
en
t
D
ut
y 
C
yc
le
Fa
m
ilia
r
Ill
us
io
n
Ph
ys
ic
al
 E
nv
iro
nm
en
t
 P
hy
si
ca
l F
ac
to
rs
Pr
eo
cc
up
at
io
n
Pr
es
su
re
Pr
of
ic
ie
nc
y
R
es
ou
rc
e 
D
ef
ic
ie
nc
y
Ta
sk
lo
ad
U
ne
xp
ec
te
d
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
1.0
Pr ( Context | Outcome, Phase )
Odds Ratios =         --------------------------------------------------
Pr ( Context | Phase )
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(* Indicates questionable numerical stability.)
 
P (ShapingFactor  Landing w/o Clearance, Approach & Landing)
 
Figure 4. Example of probability of a shaping factor given the outcome and phase of flight. 
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The example considered in figure 4 is for the Scenario of Landing without a Clearance6 and is 
associated with the Approach & Landing phase of flight. The green asterisks * are the probabilities 
of the occurrences of each of the 13 Shaping Factors (the Other category was omitted in this 
discussion) during an Approach & Landing phase of flight. The red dots    are the probabilities of the 
occurrences of the Shaping Factors during the Scenario of Landing without a Clearance in the 
Approach & Landing phase of flight. The hash marks on either side of the red dots are the 80% and 
99% uncertainty intervals. A Shaping Factor is significantly associated with this Scenario when the 
ratio of the latter probability (i.e., the red dot) to the former (the green asterisk) is greater than 1.0, as 
in the cases of those indicated by the blue arrows     for Communication Environment, Duty Cycle, 
Physical Environment, Physical Factors, Preoccupation, Proficiency, and Task Load. When both 
probabilities are small, the numerical stability of their ratio is questionable, as in the cases of 
Attitude, Familiarity, Illusion, Pressure, and Resource Deficiency: 
 
3.5.2 Results 
In the following results of this experiment, the significant Shaping Factors are identified and ranked 
(by odds ratio) for anomalous Outcomes in associated phases of flight for each of the ten ASRS 
anomalies selected for this study: 
 
Ground Phase 
Maintenance Problem is associated with: 
 Pressure  
  Pr (Pressure | Maintenance Problems, Ground Phase) = 6.4% 
  Pr (Pressure | Ground Phase) = 3.0% 
  Odds Ratio = 2.1 
Ground Incursion is associated with: 
 Familiar 
  Pr (Familiar | Ground Incursion, Ground Phase) = 8.0% 
  Pr (Familiar | Ground Phase) = 3.9% 
  Odds Ratio = 2.0 
 Communication Environment  
  Pr (Communication Environment | Ground Incursion, Ground Phase) = 8.0% 
  Pr (Communication Environment | Ground Phase) = 4.2% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.9 
 Pre-occupation 
 Pr (Pre-occupation | Ground Incursion, Ground Phase) = 9.9% 
  Pr (Pre-occupation | Ground Phase) = 5.6% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.8 
 Taskload 
  Pr (Taskload | Ground Incursion, Ground Phase) = 7.8% 
  Pr (Taskload | Ground Phase) = 4.4% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.8 
 
                                                 
6
 Landing without a Clearance is one of the subsets of Scenarios under the anomalous Outcome called Airspace  
 Violation in the set of ASRS anomalies. 
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Take-off Phase 
Conflict (airborne) is associated with: 
 Taskload 
  Pr (Taskload | Air Conflict, Take-off Phase) = 10.1% 
  Pr (Taskload | Take-off Phase) = 5.5% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.9 
 Communication Environment 
  Pr (Communication Environment | Air Conflict, Take-off Phase) = 6.2% 
  Pr (Communication Environment | Take-off Phase) = 3.6% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.7 
Non-adherence is associated with: 
 Pre-occupation 
  Pr (Pre-occupation | Non-adherence, Take-off Phase) = 8.8% 
  Pr (Pre-occupation | Take-off Phase) = 5.5% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.6 
 
Ascent Phase 
Altitude Deviation is associated with: 
 Pre-occupation 
  Pr (Pre-occupation | Altitude Deviation, Ascent Phase) = 20.3% 
  Pr (Pre-occupation | Ascent Phase) = 7.5% 
  Odds Ratio = 2.7 
 Proficiency 
  Pr (Proficiency | Altitude Deviation, Ascent Phase) = 6.4% 
  Pr (Proficiency | Ascent Phase) = 3.0% 
  Odds Ratio = 2.1 
 Physical Factors 
  Pr (Physical Factors | Altitude Deviation, Ascent Phase) = 8.1% 
  Pr (Physical Factors | Ascent Phase) = 3.9% 
  Odds Ratio = 2.1 
 Duty Cycle 
  Pr (Duty Cycle | Altitude Deviation, Ascent Phase) = 4.2% 
  Pr (Duty Cycle | Ascent Phase) = 2.2% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.9 
In-Flight Weather Encounter is associated with: 
 Taskload 
  Pr (Taskload | Altitude Deviation, Ascent Phase) = 13.5% 
  Pr (Taskload | Ascent Phase) = 5.9% 
  Odds Ratio = 2.3 
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Cruise Phase 
Altitude Deviation is associated with: 
 Pre-occupation 
  Pr (Pre-occupation | Altitude Deviation, Cruise Phase) = 15.8% 
  Pr (Pre-occupation | Cruise Phase) = 4.8% 
  Odds Ratio = 3.3 
 Physical Factors 
  Pr (Physical Factors | Altitude Deviation, Cruise Phase) = 8.4% 
  Pr (Physical Factors | Cruise Phase) = 4.3% 
  Odds Ratio = 2.0 
In-Flight Weather Encounter is associated with: 
 Pressure 
  Pr (Pressure | In Flight Wx Encounter , Cruise Phase) = 3.9% 
  Pr (Pressure | Cruise Phase) = 2.2% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.8 
Conflict (airborne) is associated with:  
 Communication Environment 
  Pr (Communication Environment | Air Conflict, Cruise Phase) = 6.8% 
  Pr (Communication Environment | Cruise Phase) = 4.2% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.6 
 
Descent Phase 
In-Flight Weather Encounter is associated with: 
 Pressure  
  Pr (Pressure | In Flight Wx Encounter, Descent Phase) = 4.8% 
  Pr (Pressure | Descent Phase) = 1.6% 
  Odds Ratio = 3.1 
Altitude Deviation is associated with: 
 Pre-occupation 
  Pr (Pre-occupation | Altitude Deviation, Descent Phase) = 15.5% 
  Pr (Pre-occupation | Descent Phase) = 8.9% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.8 
 Proficiency 
  Pr (Proficiency | Altitude Deviation, Descent Phase) = 6.9% 
  Pr (Proficiency | Descent Phase) = 4.2% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.6 
Familiar 
  Pr (Familiar | Altitude Deviation, Descent Phase) = 3.7% 
  Pr (Familiar | Descent Phase) = 2.4% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.5 
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Aircraft Equipment Problem is associated with: 
 Weather 
  Pr (Weather | Equipment Problem, Descent Phase) = 18.0% 
Pr (Weather | Descent Phase) = 11.8% 
  Odds Ratio = 1.5 
 
Approach and Landing Phase 
Airspace Violation (Landing without Clearance) is associated with: 
 Pre-occupation 
  Pr (Pre-occupation | Altitude Deviation, Approach & Landing Phase) = 27.6% 
  Pr (Pre-occupation | Approach & Landing Phase) = 6.6% 
  Odds Ratio = 4.2 
Physical Factors 
  Pr (Physical Factors | Altitude Deviation, Approach & Landing Phase) = 15.9% 
  Pr (Physical Factors | Approach & Landing Phase) = 5.7% 
  Odds Ratio = 2.8 
 Duty Cycle 
  Pr (Duty Cycle | Altitude Deviation, Approach & Landing Phase) = 10.0% 
  Pr (Duty Cycle | Approach & Landing Phase) = 3.7% 
Odds Ratio = 2.7 
 Proficiency 
  Pr (Proficiency | Altitude Deviation, Approach & Landing Phase) = 8.2% 
  Pr (Proficiency | Approach & Landing Phase) = 3.5% 
  Odds Ratio = 2.4 
 
Confirmation of these results was obtained through expert opinion. Only the important Shaping 
Factors are shown above. However, those factors that were identified as unimportant were equally 
interesting and were considered in the validation of the results. When the results of the important 
and the unimportant Shaping Factors that had been identified with each of these anomalous 
Outcomes were presented to a group of experts in aviation operations, they all agreed that, in each 
case, these seemed entirely reasonable and plausible. This experiment demonstrated a capability that 
was validated by expert opinion to analyze the narratives of experiential reports for identification of 
Shaping Factors of the human behavior in a group of reports of the same anomalous incident. 
 
Although this experiment used ASRS incident reports, the approach is applicable to any similar 
safety-reporting system. The methodology is sufficiently generic to be used with any database of 
textual reports of safety-related incidents. This was confirmed by applying the process to a set of 
Aviation Safety Action Program (ASAP) reports that were in a format quite different from those in 
the ASRS database. It was demonstrated that these reports could be reliably categorized by their 
Context and Outcomes into the anomalies that had been defined by the ASRS Office. This process 
could be adapted to any other set of anomalies or new ones given their definitions and an exemplary 
report. 
 
It has been noted throughout the discussions of this approach that it relies heavily on the domain-
specific knowledge of experts in aviation operations, and this may be seen as a hindrance to its 
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continuing development and evolution. However, as Posse et al. (Posse (2004)) point out, new 
machine-learning techniques could reduce the amount of human intervention in the learning process. 
Some of these require only a small set of seed expressions to extract automatically template 
expressions correlated to these seeds. These methods hold promise of reducing the learning phase 
while, at the same time, providing more complex expressions to match those of the domain experts 
or even uncovering expressions not anticipated by experts that are subtly related to the concept of 
interest. 
 
 
4 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
 
While this was just the initial step in developing a first-generation capability, the results of the 
experiments are sufficiently encouraging to believe that it will be possible to achieve the level of 
reliability of human analysis of narrative reports. Furthermore, automated analyses of textual reports 
have the importance of advantage of consistency that is not achievable with human analysts. 
 
The merits of an approach that built upon the concept of the Scenario described in Volume I of this 
report (Maille et al. 2006) have been demonstrated. Even the simplified model of the Scenario may 
be sufficient to meet the objectives of automated analysis of aviation-incident reports. It was 
particularly useful to the objective of this study to discover that reporters typically try to present 
their perceptions of why they performed as they did, whereas they seldom (if ever) describe the 
dimensions of their loss of situational awareness. Some success has also been achieved in pushing 
forward, just a little, the state of the art of practical application of Natural Language Processing 
using it in conjunction with more classical techniques of statistical analyses. This approach to 
automated analysis of experiential reports of aviation incidents is expected to have wide application 
to extracting useful information about why an incident occurred from any of the very large variety of 
textual databases that exist across the aviation industry. 
 
 
5 POSTSCRIPT 
 
 
This important research on the development of efficient and reliable automated analyses of incident 
reports continues. In fact, studies conducted while this report was in preparation of new statistical 
techniques have put into question the value added by using Natural Language Processing in certain 
steps of the process. Preliminary results indicate that categorization of a report by event type (i.e., 
what happened) using these new statistical methods based solely on the free narrative (i.e., without 
the fixed fields) may perform as well, or better, than NLP. It is still to be seen how well these new 
statistical methods will work on extracting the more subjective information related to Shaping 
Factors. 
 
The work described in the two volumes of this report was carried out over five years, and a great 
deal was learned about the problem of trying to understand why human operators of the aviation 
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system sometimes make mistakes by analyzing their reports. Some of these lessons are worth 
documenting. 
1. The effective application of the process requires collaboration among experts in aviation 
operations, computational linguistics, computer sciences, human factors, and statistical 
analyses. Access to experts in aviation operations throughout the development is essential to 
maximize the efficacy of automated data mining. 
2. Pre-processing the text to the language of the domain is useful regardless of the subsequent 
analysis methodology employed. However, PLADS would have to be modified, with the 
help of the domain expert, for application to textual reports in some other domain. 
3. Statistical text mining has been very effective, especially when the data set conforms to a 
well-defined taxonomic structure, when there is coherence in the concept to be identified, 
and when there are “truth data” available for training. 
4. Natural Language Processing, albeit limited and costly at present, has shown itself to be 
effective at identifying moderately illusive concepts. However, the level of performance 
achieved is highly dependent on the effective use of experts, pre-processing, and statistical 
analyses mentioned above.  
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APPENDIX A: WORKSHOP PARTICIPANTS 
 
 
Name Areas of Expertise Position (at the time of the 
Workshop) 
Mr. Alan Brothers Automated text analyses, 
statistical analyses 
Battelle PNWD** Research 
Scientist 
Captain Charles Drew Retired corporate flight captain, 
ASRS database and ASRS 
research 
Battelle* Principal Research 
Scientist 
Dr. Gaston Cangiano Modeling situation awareness, 
human performance modeling, 
computational linguistics 
SJSU Post-doc student  
Dr. Kevin Corker Human performance modeling, 
human factors, computer sciences 
Professor and Assistant Dean of 
Engineering, SJSU 
Dr. Thomas Ferryman Multivariate statistics, intelligent 
systems 
Battelle, PNWD** Chief Scientist 
Ms. Stephanie Frank ASRS operations and ASRS 
database 
Battelle* Assistant ASRS Program 
Manager 
Captain Robert Lynch  Retired flight captain, flight 
operations 
Battelle* APMS Manager 
Mr. Vince Mallone Retired air traffic controller, 
ASRS analyst 
Battelle* ASRS Manager  
Dr. Michael McGreevy  Human factors, automated text 
analysis 
NASA Research Scientist 
Ms. Rowena Morrison,  English language grammarian, 
ASRS research specialist 
Battelle* Senior Research Scientist 
Dr. Christian Posse Natural language processing, 
computer sciences  
Battelle PNWD** Scientist 
Mr. Loren Rosenthal  ASRS operations and data 
utilization, designer of the X-Form 
Battelle* Manager, Mountain View 
Operations  
Dr. Michael Shafto Human factors, computer 
sciences, human-automation 
interaction 
NASA Research Scientist 
Dr. Irving Statler ASMM Project Manager, human 
factors, data analysis 
NASA Research Engineer 
*Battelle, contractor to NASA for ASRS and APMS programs 
**Battelle Pacific Northwest Division (PNWD), home of DOE’s Pacific Northwest Laboratory 
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APPENDIX B: ASRS ANOMALIES 
 
 
ASRS Anomaly codes provide classification of abnormal or irregular events, or events at variance 
with ATC clearances or instructions. An Anomaly is typically a negative descriptor, i.e., an 
abnormality, irregularity, or a deviation from an expected operation or rule. The “Other” field is not 
used to enter acts/events that are neither illegal nor deviate from published procedure. For example, 
a controller technique issue that is not illegal or does not violate published procedure is not entered 
in “Other.” 
 
 
 Category Test 
  Set 
 
Aircraft equipment problem 
− Critical  #1− Less severe 
Airspace violation 
− Entry 
#10 − Exit 
Altitude deviation 
− Overshoot 
− Undershoot #2
− Excursion from assigned altitude 
− Crossing restriction not met 
Other spatial deviation 
− Altitude heading rule deviation 
− Controlled flight towards terrain 
− Track or heading deviation 
− Uncontrolled traffic pattern deviation 
− Descent below MSA 
Ground excursion 
− Ramp 
− Runway 
− Taxiway 
Ground incursion 
− Taxiway 
#6− Landing without clearance 
− Runway #5
Ground encounters 
− Animal 
− Birds 
− Foreign object damage (FOD) 
− Person 
− Vehicle 
− Gear-up landing 
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− Jet Blast 
− Other 
Conflict 
− Airborne, less severe 
#3− Airborne, critical 
− Near mid-air collision (NMAC) 
− Ground, less severe 
#4− Ground, critical 
In-flight encounter 
− Birds 
− Turbulence 
− Skydivers 
− Wake turbulence 
− Weather #7 
− VFR in IMC 
− Other 
Maintenance problem 
− Improper maintenance #8− Improper documentation 
− Non-compliance with MEL 
Cabin event 
− Galley fire 
− Passenger misconduct 
− Passenger illness 
− Passenger contraband 
− Passenger electronic device 
− Other 
Non-adherence 
− Clearance 
− FAR #9 
− Published procedure 
− Company policies 
− Required legal separation 
− Other 
Other anomaly 
− Loss of aircraft control 
− Unstabilized approach 
− Hard landing 
− Tail strike 
− Speed deviation 
− Smoke or fire 
− Hazardous material violation 
− Fumes 
− Other 
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